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INTRODUCTION

HE civil application of Younger v. HarrisI is enmeshed in a
doctrinal quagmire. The seeds of this confusion were perhaps sown in
Younger itself, in which Justice Stewart, concurring, observed that the
Court's decision was limited to "the proper policy to be followed by a
federal court when asked to intervene by injunction or declaratory judgment in a criminalprosecution which is contemporaneously pending in a
state court." 2 He cautiously added, however, that the Court might have
taken a different view if federal intervention were sought in connection
with a state civil proceeding.3 Younger and its companion cases4 pro* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A. 1969,
Brooklyn College of the City University of New York; J.D. 1972, Rutgers University
School of Law-Camden.
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Scholarly commentary on Younger and its progeny is legion.
The principal commentaries are collected in Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in
Context, 33 Hastings L.J. 103, 103 n. 1 (1981), and in Developments in the Law-Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274 n.2 (1977) [hereinafter Developments].
In view of existing scholarship, this Article will detail neither the facts of the Younger
case, nor the historical development of the Younger doctrine. For extensive discussions
of these topics, see id. at 1274-82; Wechsler, FederalCourts, State CriminalLaw and the
First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 740, 866-88 (1974); Whitten, FederalDeclaratory
and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the
Limits of JudicialDiscretion, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 591, 649-83 (1975).
2. Younger, 401 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. See id. Justice Stewart noted that "since all these cases involve state criminal
prosecutions, we do not deal with the considerations that should govern a federal court
when it is asked to intervene in state civil proceedings, where, for various reasons, the
balance might be struck differently." Id. (footnote omitted).
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duced the modem doctrine of federal noninterference with an ongoing
state criminal proceeding. 5 The doctrine, referred to by Justice Black in
Younger as "Our Federalism," 6 has been variously characterized as one
of comity, 7 deference, 8 equitable restraint, 9 or abstention.' ° Regardless
of how it has been characterized, the Younger doctrine has certainly been
controversial, 1 particularly in its application to civil litigation.2
In the fourteen years since first applying the doctrine outside the crim4. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The five companion cases along with Younger are generally
referred to as the Younger "sextet." See, e.g., Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A
Modelfor Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 27, 29 & n.3 (1976); Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger
Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 Duke L.J. 987, 989
n.10.
5. For a discussion of the historical antecedents of Younger, see authorities cited
supra note 1.
6. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Several leading commentators refer to the Younger doctrine as "Our Federalism." See, e.g., H. Fink & M. Tushnet, Federal Jurisdiction: Policy
and Practice 663 (2d ed. 1987); C. McCormick, J. Chadbourn & C. Wright, Cases and
Materials on Federal Courts 414 (8th ed. 1988); M. Redish, Federal Courts: Cases, Comments, and Questions 868 (2d ed. 1989); M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the
Allocation of Judicial Power 291-321 (1980) [hereinafter M. Redish, Tensions]; C.
Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 52A, at 320-30 (4th ed. 1983); 17A C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 4251-4255, at 180-267 (2d ed.
1988).
7. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 4, at 29; Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two
for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 Loy. L. Rev. 659, 661 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of A
Rationale,63 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 463-65 (1978); Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in
the Era of Younger v. Harris, 59 B.U.L. Rev. 597, 597 (1979).
9. See, e.g., P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Miskin & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1398 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler];
Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention into Ongoing
State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 49, 49 n.3, 54 (1987); Nichol, Federalism, State
Courts, and Section 1983, 73 Va. L. Rev. 959, 961 (1987); Comment, Limiting the
Younger Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1318, 1318 (1979).
10. See, e.g., P. Low & J. Jeffries, Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations 521 (1987); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-28, at 197, § 3-30, at 202
(2d ed. 1988); Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 91 (1984); Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 599-600. The Supreme
Court has classified the Younger doctrine as a form of abstention. See, e.g., Deakins v.
Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523, 525-29 (1988); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-14
(1987); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 62527 (1986); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237-39 (1984); Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 425, 431-37 (1982);
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-17 (1976).
11. See L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 3-30, at 205; 17A C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, supra note 6, § 4251, at 180; Koury, supra note 7, at 709.
12. The extension of Younger to civil litigation has generated substantial scholarly
criticism. The principal commentaries are collected in 17A C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, supra note 6, § 4254, at 236 n.3; Comment, Civil Rights Suits that Interfere with
Ongoing State Civil Proceedings: Younger Abstention in the Wake of Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 24 Hous. L. Rev. 917, 919 n.9 (1987).
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inal context,13 the Court has moved cautiously yet definitively toward the
full civil application of Younger.14 Nevertheless, with each extension, the
Court has repeated the caveat that Younger did not extend to all civil
litigation.1 5 The Court reiterated this warning most recently in Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco Inc., 6 writing that "[o]ur opinion does not hold that
Younger abstention is always appropriate whenever a civil proceeding is
pending in a state court." 7 Despite this routine disclaimer, the Pennzoil
Court applied the Younger doctrine to a civil dispute between private
litigants in which there was no objectively discernible state interest at
stake. Consequently, Pennzoil heralds the full civil application of
Younger.
The Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained why Younger
abstention should be limited to a pending state criminal or civil enforcement proceeding. Moreover, by shifting rationales for the doctrine in
subsequent cases,1 8 the Court has permitted the doctrine's theoretical
foundation to support its application in civil as well as criminal litigation.
Without entering the debate concerning the wisdom of Younger itself,19
13. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (state nuisance proceeding,
quasi-criminal); infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 n.8 (1979) ("Therefore, contrary to the
suggestion of the dissent, we do not remotely suggest 'that every pending proceeding
between a State and a federal plaintiff justifies abstention unless one of the exceptions to
Younger applies.' "); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 445 n.8 (1977) ("we have no
occasion to decide whether Younger principles apply to all civil litigation"); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n. 13 (1977) ("we save for another day the question of'the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation'" (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,
607 (1975))); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975) ("For the purposes of
the case before us, however, we need make no general pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation.").
16. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
17. Id. at 14 n.12.
18. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. These cases, particularly Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), emphasize Younger's comity and federalism underpinnings,
which are implicated by civil and criminal litigation. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975), the Court had expressly acknowledged that the equity branch of
Younger was inapplicable to civil litigation: "Younger... also rests upon the traditional
reluctance of courts of equity, even within a unitary system, to interfere with a criminal
prosecution. Strictly speaking, this element of Younger is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil cases." Id. at 604.
19. Cf. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590 (1977) (opposing Pullman abstention because problems of delay, expense, reviewability, and misuse
outweigh doctrine's benefits). Compare Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103, 1116-21
(1977) (criticizing Younger's impact on Dombrowski) and Redish, supra note 8, at 477-87
(questioning the validity of the Younger doctrine's theoretical rationales) and Redish,
supra note 10, at 91-95 (criticizing the policy rationales of Younger abstention as judicial
legislation) and Zeigler, supra note 4, at 1020-44 (criticizing Younger as contravening
legislative intent in section 1983) with Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 616-22 (1981) (supporting Younger because
costs of federal interference with state proceedings are too high) and Rosenfeld, supra
note 8, at 644-58 (supporting reasonable use of Younger abstention) and Wells, Why Professor Redish isWrong About Abstention, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 1097, 1112-15, 1122, 1132-33
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the thesis of this Article is that, given the doctrine's prior civil extensions
and its recent application in Pennzoil, Younger abstention can no longer
be limited to prior pending state criminal, quasi-criminal,20 and civil enforcement actions.
Part I of the Article explores the background and theoretical foundations of Younger abstention. Part II traces the civil expansion of Younger
prior to Pennzoil. Part III analyzes the distressingly divided Pennzoil
Court, which mustered only a bare majority in support of abstention.
Finally, Part IV offers both theoretical and pragmatic grounds for extending the doctrine.

I.

BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF YOUNGER ABSTENTION

Younger was decided at the end of the Warren Court era, a time when
federal courts routinely interfered with state court proceedings in order
to protect the federal constitutional rights of state court defendants. 2'
The federal judiciary's activist role during the late 1960s stands in
marked contrast to the role originally envisaged by the founding fathers.
As one scholar wrote, under our constitutional scheme, the state courts
"are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases
they may be the ultimate ones." 22 The framers of the Constitution evidently believed that state courts could adequately adjudicate federal
rights, for the Constitution did not mandate the establishment of inferior
federal courts.2 3 Instead, it left the creation of lower federal courts to the
discretion of Congress. 24 Had Congress never created inferior federal
(1985) (arguing that it is appropriate for federal judges to limit jurisdictional grants by
abstention doctrines).
A concise summary of the arguments in support of and in opposition to the Younger
doctrine, including citations to recent scholarship, can be found in L. Tribe, supra note
10, § 3-30, at 205-08.
20. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965); cf Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (upholding anti-picketing statute and distinguishing Dombrowski. See generallyBailey, EnjoiningState CriminalProsecutions Which Abridge First Amendment Freedoms, 3 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 67, 10624 (1967) (advocating expansion of Dombrowski; Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend in Federal-State Judicial Relations, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 71, 94-103 (1966) (analyzing and
endorsing Dombrowski).
22. Hart, The Power of Congressto Limit the JurisdictionofFederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953).
23. Article III of the Constitution provides in relevant part that "[t]he judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.For
summaries of the ratification debates concerning article III, section 1 of the Constitution,
see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 9, at 10-11; Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to
Control the Jurisdictionof Lower Federal Courts: A CriticalReview and a New Synthesis,
124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 52-56 (1975).
24. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 9, at 10-11; M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6,
at 21; Redish & Woods, supra note 23, at 52-56.
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courts, federal rights could have been enforced only in the existing state
courts, or in limited circumstances, in the Supreme Court.
Although the first Congress immediately exercised its discretion to create lower federal courts,2 5 their jurisdiction was extremely limited.2 6 In
particular, Congress failed to confer the Constitution's grant of judicial
power over cases and controversies arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States in creating the inferior federal courts.27 The
original lower federal courts were created principally to adjudicate diversity cases;28 there was no statutory general federal question jurisdiction
for private civil litigation.
During the first seventy-five years of the federal judicial system,
roughly the period from the first Judiciary Act to Reconstruction, it was
generally accepted that "private litigants must look to the state tribunals
in the first instance for vindication of federal claims, subject to limited
review by the United States Supreme Court."2 9 Thus, prior to Reconstruction, the state courts were the primary legal fora of the nation and
"the federal courts were subsidiary courts."3
As a result of the Civil War and Reconstruction, however, the view
that state courts were the primary vindicators of federal rights was
largely abandoned.3 1 Although the process of change started during the
25. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra
note 9, at 30-33 (tracing organization and growth of federal judicial system); M. Redish,
Tensions, supra note 6, at 21 (discussing Congress' power to establish lower federal
courts); Redish & Woods, supra note 23, at 52-56 (discussing framers' debate over scope
of Congress' discretion to create inferior federal courts).
26. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 9, at 30-33; see also Frankfurter, Distributionof
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 507-15
(1928) (surveying history ofjurisdiction of lower federal courts). Following the adoption
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was much debated whether the lower courts must necessarily exercise all the judicial power of the United States not allocated by the Constitution
to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or whether Congress could confer less
than the constitutional maximum in creating such courts. The latter view prevailed. See
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1850). But cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816) (Story, J.) (construing the words "shall be vested" in Art.
III, § 1 to require that entire grant of federal judicial power in Art. III, § 2 be vested in
some federal court).
27. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 9, at 32.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 960 (footnote omitted); see also Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 131 (1923) (Judiciary Act was a
compromise between Federalist view that all judicial power should reside in federal
courts and the other view that federal government was "destroyer of states' rights").
Dissenting in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), Justice Brennan expressed the view
that Reconstruction legislation affecting the jurisdiction of the federal courts "completely
altered Congress' pre-Civil War policy of relying on state courts to vindicate rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws." Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("In the early days of our Republic, Congress was content to leave the task of
interpreting and applying federal laws in the first instance to the state courts ....").
30. F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 64 (1928).
31. See id. at 64-65; cf. Gressman, The Unhappy History of CivilRights Legislation, 50
Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1357 (1952) (Reconstruction legislation "premised on the belief that

1002

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

Civil War,3 2 it climaxed in 1875 when Congress granted the federal
courts permanent general federal question jurisdiction3 3 for the first
time.34 Thereafter, according to two early twentieth century commentators, the federal courts "ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing
between citizens of different states and became the primary and powerful
reliances for vindicating every right35 given by the Constitution, the laws,
and treaties of the United States."

The Reconstruction Congress enacted a series of civil rights and jurisdictional acts, 36 under which the federal courts eventually became the

primary vindicators of federal rights. The Act of April 20, 187 1,3 was
the centerpiece of this congressional effort. This now famous provision is
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in 3an
8 action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
the fundamental rights of the individual should be defined and enforced by the federal
government"); Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisionsof the Civil Rights Act of 1866:
A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 Yale L.J. 565, 566-67 (1989)
(framers of Civil Rights Act of 1866 intended that civil rights violations be remedied in
federal courts).
32. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 9, at 961-62.
33. See Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (currently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). There was substantial controversy concerning the intended scope
of the statutory grant of general federal question jurisdiction. See D. Currie, Federal
Courts: Cases and Materials 190-92 (3d ed. 1982); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 9, at
995-97; M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 64. The statutory language tracks the
constitutional grant of federal question jurisdiction. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)
("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") with U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 ("The
Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority ....
). However, the statutory language has been given a narrower
interpretation. One commentator concluded: "[D]espite the striking similarity in language of the two provisions ... it is now well established that the scope of the general
federal question statute is considerably narrower than that of the constitutional provision." M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 64.
34. There was one earlier, short-lived attempt to confer general federal question jurisdiction. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §§ 11-13, 2 Stat. 89, 92-93, repealed by Act of
March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. See generallyHart & Wechsler, supra note 9, at 960-61
(describing political origins of Congress' first attempt to confer general federal question
jurisdiction); Frankfurter, supra note 26, at 507-08 (same).
35. F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra note 30, at 65.
36. For descriptions of these actions, see Developments, supra note 1, at 1141-56. For
a discussion of the legislative background of the Civil Rights Acts, see Gressman, supra
note 31, at 1324-36; Kaczorowski, supra note 31, at 567-90.
37. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For the historical and political background of section
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Although recently the Court has read section 1983 expansively,3 9 in the
immediate post-Reconstruction period courts construed it very narrowly,
almost to the point of impotence."
Then, in 1939, the Court launched a new era of civil rights enforcement in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,4 1 which enjoined local officials under section 1983 from using local law to interfere
with labor organizers. 42 This decision marked the first significant use of
section 1983 in a case not involving racial discrimination or voting rights.
Because Hague and other early section 1983 cases involved official conduct directly sanctioned by state or local law,4 3 they clearly satisfied even
the narrowest definition of the statute's "under color of" law requirement, which had previously been interpreted in a restrictive manner.'
Although the narrow view of the "under color of" law requirement was
largely abandoned by the Court in the 1940s, 45 the modem renaissance of
section 1983 did not begin until 1961 with Monroe v. Pape.4 6
An explosion of civil rights litigation, mostly brought under section
1983, occurred in the twenty years following Monroe.4 7 Significantly, the
awakening of section 1983 from its ninety-year dormancy occurred at the
same time that constitutional rights, particularly those affecting state
criminal defendants,48 were undergoing revolutionary change.4 9 The
1983, see Logan, JudicialFederalism in the Court of History, 66 Or. L. Rev. 453, 505-10
(1987); Developments, supra note 1, at 1153-56.
39. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See generally P. Low & J.
Jeffries, supra note 10, at 853-54 (discussing impact of Monroe v. Pape); Developments,
supra note 1, at 1167-75 (describing emergence of section 1983 from dormancy).
More recently, however, the Court has contracted the scope of section 1983. See, e.g.,
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Hicks
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
40. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 630-32, 636-44 (1882); Developments,
supra note 1, at 1156-67; cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (construing Civil
Rights Act of March 1, 1875).
One commentator found that only 21 actions were brought under the predecessors to
section 1983 in the period from 1871 to 1920. See Comment, The CivilRights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 Ind. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). During the
next 20 years, litigants occasionally invoked the statute, primarily in voting rights cases.
See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 273-75 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536,
537, 540-41 (1927).
41. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
42. See id. at 516.
43. See, e.g., id. at 501-03; Lane, 307 U.S. at 270-72 & n.l; Nixon, 273 U.S. at 539-40.
44. See P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 10, at 850-51; Developments, supra note 1, at

1168.
45. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941). Both Screws and Classic broadly interpreted the "under color of" law language from the precursor to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982), the criminal analogue of section
1983. See P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 10, at 852; Developments, supra note 1, at 1168-

69.
46. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see Developments, supra note I, at 1169.
47. See P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 10, at 853-54 & n.g; Developments, supra note
1, at 1172.
48. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
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combined expansion of section 1983 and constitutional fights undoubtedly precipitated greater use of section 1983.50 As a result, some observers expressed concern that these developments had caused a dangerous
increase in the workload of the federal courts.5" They further warned
that increased section 1983 litigation would upset the delicate balance of
power between the states and the federal government.5 2
5 3 emerged in the wake of
The abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris
these developments. In Younger, a three-judge district court 4 issued an
injunction against a pending California criminal prosecution, which had
been brought under a patently unconstitutional statute.5 5 On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's grant of injunctive relief.
Writing for a majority of eight, 56 Justice Black based the reversal on
two distinct but related grounds. Describing the first as a "basic doctrine
of equity jurisprudence," 5 7 Justice Black stated that "courts of equity
should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal
prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and
will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."'58 Although
some scholars criticized the Court's reliance on equitable principles, 59
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). See generally Wilkinson, Justice John M. Harlan and the Values of Federalism,
57 Va. L. Rev. 1185 (1971) (describing Justice Harlan's efforts to restrain far-reaching
efforts of Warren Court during this era).
49. See generally L. Bozell, The Warren Revolution (1966) (discussing constitutional
decisions by Warren Court). Cases expanding first amendment rights during this period
are collected in Wechsler, supra note 1, at 834-35 & n.408.
50, See H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 75 & n.4, 87 (1973); Developments, supra note 1, at 1172.
51. See H. Friendly, supra note 50, at 87-107; Developments, supra note 1, at 1172 &
nn. 223-24.
52. See, e.g., H. Friendly, supra note 50, at 90-92; Weinberg, The New JudicialFederalism, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1191, 1210 (1977) (suggesting that unrestrained use of section
1983 could result in "total federal control over state adjudications, public and private,
destroying any significant independent role for the state tribunals in our federal system."); Developments, supra note 1, at 1172 & n.226.

53. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
54. Prior to its amendment in 1976, the Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90
Stat. 1119 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982)), required the convening of a special threejudge district court to hear constitutional challenges to state laws. See 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 4234-4235 (2d ed. 1988). Currently, the use of three-judge district courts is generally restricted to certain voting rights
cases. See id. § 4235.
55. In Younger, the federal plaintiff was charged with violation of the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 11400-11401 (West 1982), which had been
upheld against a constitutional challenge in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
After the indictment of the federal plaintiff in Younger, the Supreme Court struck down a
similar criminal syndicalism statute in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Justice
Black recounted these developments in Younger, 401 U.S. at 38-41.
56. Only Justice Douglas dissented. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 38; id. at 58 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 43.
58. Id. at 43-44.
59. See, e.g., Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: ReconstructingReconstruction,

1989]

YOUNGER ABSTENTION

1005

earlier case law arguably supported the Court's application of equity in
Younger. 6°
The second ground, characterized by Justice Black as an "even more
vital consideration, '' 61 evolved from the related doctrines of comity and
federalism. Together, these doctrines require federal courts to acknowledge the independent nature of state institutions and not unduly interfere
with legitimate state functions, even when called upon to enforce federal
rights. 62 Thus, under the doctrines of comity and federalism, a federal
55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1144, 1148-63 (1977); Wechsler, supra note 1, at 875; see also
Whitten, supra note 1, at 611-13 (discussing equity in a merged law and equity system);
cf Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 119-21 & n.4 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (casting doubt on use of principles of comity in deciding between state or federal court adjudication), analyzed in Note, The Extension of Comity:
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 32 Am. U.L. Rev. 1123 (1983);
Fiss, supra note 19, at 1107 (criticizing Court's reliance on equity principles in Douglas v.
City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943)).
60. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943); Williams v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942) (per curiam); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400-02 (1941);
Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 49-51 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95-97 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926). These
cases have been referred to as the Fenner line of cases.
Certain scholars disagreed with the Court's reliance on the Fennerline of cases. See,
e.g., Wechsler, supra note 1, at 875 ("to the extent the Court based Younger on prior law,
it relied upon sheer mythology, a total misconception of pre-Dombrowski history and
precedent"); see also Weinberg, supra note 52, at 1206-09 (distinguishing Younger and
Dombrowski, and arguing that result in Younger was not surprising); cf Laycock, Federal
Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev.
636, 641-59 (1979) (reviewing pre-Dombrowski precedents and concluding that injunctions against threatened prosecutions issued routinely and rested on sound doctrinal basis); Soifer & Macgill, supra note 59, at 1144, 1148-63 (arguing that "[t]he history, policy,
and precedent Justice Black relied upon [in Younger], while not entirely made up for the
occasion, were selected with care and used to construct a rhetorical scaffolding dangerously out of proportion to the somewhat modest holding").
61. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
62. Discussing the concept of comity, Justice Black coined the phrase "Our
Federalism":
[The] reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal
prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of
"comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to
describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with
the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any
more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our
National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses.
What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be
forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in the early struggling days
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court may not restrain a pending state criminal prosecution when the
federal claims could be raised as a defense in the pending state proceeding. The Court recognized certain exceptions to this principle of equitable restraint, including a bad faith prosecution aimed at harassing a
federal plaintiff or other "extraordinary circumstances" requiring federal
interference. 63 Although the Court articulated exceptions to the Younger
doctrine, Justice Black made it clear that the exceptions should be invoked only rarely."
65
Justice Black's opinion announced the doctrine of "Our Federalism,,
and presented two broad policy reasons for noninterference with state
courts, but failed to articulate, except indirectly, the theoretical underpinnings of Younger's doctrinal principle. The theoretical contours of
Younger began to emerge in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion. First,
Justice Stewart firmly anchored the Younger doctrine to a pending state
criminal proceeding. 66 Thus, he implied that a state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws is more vital as a matter of policy than is the interest
of a single criminal defendant in an alternative, federal forum, 67 provided
that the defendant has an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in
the pending state proceeding.6" Undoubtedly, a state has a strong interest in defining and enforcing its own criminal laws free of federal oversight. This function is perhaps the most important to the sovereign
independence of the several states.6 9 This conclusion follows from the
of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45. Commentators have characterized "Our Federalism" as
"reminiscent of 1940's radio serial titles," Redish, supra note 8, at 464, and Justice
Black's description as "read[ing] almost like a patriotic hymn." Edwards, The Changing
Notion of "Our Federalism", 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1015, 1015 (1987).
63. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54. The exceptions to the general rule of noninterference "are so narrow that they will admit only a trivial number of cases into federal court
for original adjudication." Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991,
1045 n.211 (1985). For a discussion of the Younger exceptions, see id. at 1045 n.210; see
also L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 3-30, at 204-05 & nn.11-12 (discussing exceptions to
Younger abstention).
64. Justice Black stated: "[T]he normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to
enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions." 401 U.S. at
45.
65. See supra note 62.
66. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart also may have anticipated Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), which upheld federal declaratory relief in
the absence of a prior pending state action. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("the Court today does not resolve the problems involved when a federal
court is asked to give injunctive or declaratory relief from future state criminal prosecutions"); see also infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (discussing Steffel).
67. See 401 U.S. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. See id.; see also id. at 45 (" 'The accused should first set up and rely upon his
defense in the state courts ... unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford
adequate protection.'" (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 244 (1926))); infra notes
146-50 and accompanying text.
69. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157, 162-63 (1943); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941).
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division of powers between the states and the federal government implicit
in the constitutional framework.
Although Younger rested on the twin pillars of equity and federalism,
Younger's progeny toppled the equity pillar and reinforced the federalism pillar.70 This shift in Younger's doctrinal foundation was clearly articulated in Juidice v. Vail.7 1 In JuidiceJustice Rehnquist unambiguously
asserted that the predominant concerns behind the Younger doctrine
were comity and federalism, and not the involvement of the state criminal process.72 Prior to its decision in Juidice, the Court had first applied
Younger outside the criminal context in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.73 In
Huffman, the Court identified four theoretical underpinnings of
Younger's comity-federalism rationale. 74 The first is noninterference
7
This rationale,
with the state's effectuation of its substantive policiesY.
however, is generally applicable only to criminal or civil enforcement
proceedings. 76 The second is preventing general disruption of state judicial proceedings and allowing states to provide forums to adjudicate constitutional claims.77 Third, Younger abstention avoids "duplicative legal
proceedings,,7 1 which would otherwise injure the systemic economy of
70. See infra notes 71-72, 93-96, 127-29 and accompanying text; see also Yackle,
supra note 63, at 1042. Professor Yackle trenchantly summarizes the doctrinal shift:
The Justices have abandoned the language of equity jurisprudence in explaining
their hesitancy to allow early federal intervention and have substituted more
general references to federalism and comity. The Court's separation of the doctrine of restraint from equity generally should be applauded. In abandoning
reliance on equitable doctrines, however, the Court has ceased to limit Younger
to criminal proceedings, as if it were only the equitable rule against enjoining
criminal proceedings that linked Younger restraint to criminal cases in the first
instance. The Court now seems committed to federal restraint in noncriminal
cases in which state officers initiate litigation in state court to further important
state policies. In those cases, however, relitigation in habeas is unavailable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
71. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
72. See id. at 334.
73. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
74. The Court stated:
[I]nterference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state not only from
effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the
separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted "as
reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional
principles."
Id. at 604 (citing with a "cf." cite and quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462
(1974)).
75. See id.
76. Although possible in private civil litigation, interference with state substantive
policy is more likely to occur when the state is prosecuting a criminal or civil enforcement claim. If the state is willing to commit resources to an action, there is likely to be
an important substantive policy at stake.
77. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
78. Id.
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the combined state-federal judicial system. 79 Finally, Younger abstention
prevents negative inferences concerning a state court's ability to enforce
constitutional principles.8 0
Building on the Huffman opinion and drawing strands of his analysis
from Younger and its other progeny, Professor Martin Redish articulated
four theoretical foundations for Younger abstention:8 '
(1) The desire to avoid affronting state judges by questioning their
competence and/or willingness to enforce constitutional rights; (2) the
need to prevent federal judicial interference with the accomplishment
of state substantive legislative goals; (3) the need to preserve the discretion of state executive officers in general and state prosecutors in particular, and (4) the desire to prevent federal interference with the
orderly operation of the state judicial process.82
Although critical of all four theoretical foundations for Younger abstention,8 3 Professor Redish is most disparaging of the second and third
foundations, which implicate state substantive policy and state executive
branch discretion.84 The second and third foundations, however, have
been substantially undermined by subsequent case law, 85 and should be
accorded little or no weight in deciding to extend Younger to civil
litigation.
Nevertheless, without considering their intrinsic merit, all four of Redish's foundations are readily applicable to civil proceedings in which the
state is enforcing a substantial governmental interest. Consequently, the
Supreme Court has had little practical or theoretical difficulty in extending Younger to civil enforcement proceedings.
II.

PRE-PENNZOIL EXTENSIONS OF YOUNGER ABSTENTION
To CIVIL LITIGATION

Although it had earlier opportunities to extend Younger to civil litigation, 6 the Supreme Court avoided any expansion outside the criminal
context until Huffman v. Pursue,Ltd. 7 Huffman may have been chosen
to extend Younger to civil litigation because it enabled the Court to
79. This rationale, at least facially, provides no preference between the systems. It
only requires that there be one rather than two proceedings.
80. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
81. See M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 298; Redish, supra note 8, at 465-73.
82. M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 298; see also Redish, supra note 8, at 465-66
(listing same four rationales in a different order).
83. See M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 298-302; Redish, supra note 8, at 47387.
84. See M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 300-02; Redish, supra note 8, at 477-80.
85. See infra notes 227, 232-36 and accompanying text.
86. See Koury, supra note 7, at 673 & n.70 (citing cases between Younger and
Huffman in which Court avoided issue of Younger's application to civil litigation, and
citing lower court civil applications during same interval); see also Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 n. 1 (1975) (raising Younger concerns in civil litigation).
87. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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achieve doctrinal consistency with Younger and its criminal progeny.8 8
Huffman arose from the efforts of a local prosecutor and sheriff to close a
theater exhibiting pornographic films.8 9 Proceeding under Ohio's public
nuisance law, 90 the local officials obtained a judgment closing the theater
for one year and providing for the seizure and sale of the theater's property. 9 1 Instead of appealing the adverse judgment within the state system, the theater owner sought and obtained a federal injunction
under
92
section 1983 against enforcement of the state court judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed on appeal. After explaining that Younger
rested not only on the long-standing equitable policy against enjoining
state criminal prosecutions, 93 but also on the "even more vital consideration" 94 of comity,9 5 the Court concluded that "[t]he component of
Younger which rests upon the threat to our federal system is thus applicable to a civil proceeding such as this quite as much as it is to a criminal
proceeding." 96 The Court buttressed its view that Younger applied
equally to a civil proceeding in which the state sought to enforce a nuisance statute by characterizing the proceeding as "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases." 97 By drawing a comparison
between Ohio's quasi-criminal nuisance statute and a criminal prosecution, the Court may have been attempting to bring Huffman within the
equitable branch of the Younger doctrine. 98 In subsequent decisions,
however, the Court demonstrated that Huffman relied more on
Younger's comity-federalism branch. 9 9 The underlying rationales of
Younger-preventing interference with state substantive policy, avoiding
disruption of a state judicial system, refraining from duplication of effort
and negative inferences regarding the competency of state judges-would
be implicated whether the proceeding were criminal, quasi-criminal or
civil enforcement. 1°° Consequently, at least in the nuisance proceeding
at issue in Huffman, the Court had no difficulty extending Younger to a
civil enforcement case.
88. The Court recognized that there was little difference between a state acting to
enforce a quasi-criminal nuisance statute and a criminal statute. See 420 U.S. at 604;
infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
89. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 595.
90. See id. at 595-97 & nn.3, 5-8.

91. See id. at 598.
92. See id. at 598-99.
93. See id. at 599-601.

94. Id. at 601 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
95. See id.; supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
96. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
97. Id. The Court concluded that "an offense to the State's interest in the nuisance
litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding."

Id.

98. See Koury, supra note 7, at 674-75 & n.78. Professor Koury speculates that this
language may have misled lower federal courts to limit Huffman's ambit to quasi-criminal contexts.
99. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
100. See 420 U.S. at 604-05; supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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Two terms after Huffman, the Court further extended Younger to civil
actions in two very different contexts.1 Taken together, these opinions
established that the Court saw10the
theoretical underpinnings of Younger
2
as firmly rooted in federalism.
The first case was Juidice v. Vail,'°3 which the Pennzoil Court relied
upon almost exclusively in extending Younger to wholly private civil litigation. 11 The underlying litigation in Juidice dealt with debt collection
between private parties in a New York state court.'0 5 Vail, the state
court defendant, failed to answer or otherwise respond to the action. 106
After a default judgment had been entered, the judgment creditor invoked New York's supplementary procedures to ascertain whether Vail,
the judgment debtor, had any assets to satisfy the judgment.10 7 Vail
failed to appear for a scheduled supplementary deposition, and was ordered by the court to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.10 8 He still refused to cooperate and was held in contempt, and
eventually fined and jailed."0 9 Vail then commenced a class action on
behalf of a class of judgment debtors in federal district court under section 1983, seeking to enjoin New York's statutory contempt procedures
on the ground that the procedures, insofar as they resulted in confinement, violated the fourteenth amendment.110
The Supreme Court unequivocally stated that the Younger doctrine
was not confined to state criminal or quasi-criminal cases."' The Court
suggested that Younger applied whenever a federal court was asked to
interfere with
a pending state proceeding implicating state institutional
2
functions. 1

Recognizing the vital state interest implicated by the invocation of the
contempt power, the Court extended Younger's abstention doctrine to a
pending state contempt proceeding:
These principles apply to a case in which the State's contempt process is involved. A State's interest in the contempt process, through
which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system, so long
as that system itself affords the opportunity to pursue federal claims
within it, is surely an important interest. Perhaps it is not quite as
important as is the State's interest in the enforcement of its criminal
laws, or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal pro101.
(1977);
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
infra notes 103-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
430 U.S. 327 (1977).
See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
See Juidice, 430 U.S. at 329.
See id. at 329-30.
See id. at 329.
See id.
See id. at 329-30.
See id. at 330.
See id. at 334.
See id. 334-36.
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ceeding such as was involved in Huffman. But we think it is of sufficiently great import to require application of the principles of those
cases. The contempt power
lies at the core of the administration of a
113
State's judicial system.
Although the underlying state litigation was purely private, and the principal beneficiary of the contempt process114 was a private civil litigant,
the Court evidently relied on the state's strong interest in the contempt
process to trigger application of Younger's abstention doctrine. At this
point in the development of Younger's civil progeny, the Court appeared
unwilling to break away from the criminal roots of Younger with their
important state interest element. Nevertheless, as Justice Brennan
plainly recognized in a bitter and sarcastic dissent, the seeds for the full
civil expansion of Younger were sown in Juidice.115
Two months after Juidice, the Court returned to the conundrum of
Younger's civil application in Trainor v. Hernandez."6 In a civil action
brought in state court, an Illinois state agency sought the return of public
assistance funds alleged to have been fraudulently obtained by the defendants. 7 Simultaneously, the agency instituted an attachment pro113. Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
114. Arguably, a distinction should be drawn between civil and criminal contempt.
For a discussion of the differences in purpose, effect and the overlap of civil and criminal
contempt, see 0. Fiss & D. Rendleman, Injunctions 831-67 (2d ed. 1984); 11 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2960 (1973) (discussing contempt process in
federal courts); Andre, The Final Judgment Rule and Party Appeals of Civil Contempt
Orders: Time for a Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1041, 1042-60 (1980); Dobbs, Contempt
of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183, 235-49 (1971); Comment, Civil and Criminal
Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 Yale L.J. 83 (1947). Overlap between the two types of
contempt is considerable. Compare N.Y. Jud. Law § 750 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1989) (power of courts to punish for criminal contempts) with N.Y. Jud. Law § 753 (McKinney 1975) (power of courts to punish for civil contempts). The Juidice Court implied,
however, that the distinction was not meaningful:
Whether disobedience of a court-sanctioned subpoena, and the resulting process
leading to a finding of contempt of court, is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or
criminal in nature, we think the salient fact is that federal-court interference
with the State's contempt process is "an offense to the State's interest.., likely
to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding."
Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
115. See Juidice, 430 U.S. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded: "Huffman's 'quasi-criminal' rationale and today's reliance on state 'contempt
power' are revealed to be only covers for the ultimate goal of denying § 1983 plaintiffs the
federal forum in any case, civil or criminal, when a pending state proceeding may hear
the federal plaintiff's federal claims." Id.
Justice Brennan's cynicism regarding the majority's denial of Younger's general civil
applicability was thus revealed:
I suspect that the purported disclaimer that "[a]s we did in Huffman, we save
for another day the question of 'the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation
. '""..is tongue in cheek, and that "save" in today's disclaimer is a signal that
merely the formal announcement is being postponed.
Id. at 345 n.* (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
116. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
117. See id. at 435-36.
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ceeding to freeze the defendants' credit union account.1 1 8 Rather than
respond to the attachment or the underlying state litigation, the state
defendants sought relief under section 1983 in federal district court. 1 9
The federal complaint alleged that the Illinois attachment statute120 deprived the debtors of their property without due process of law."12 The
federal complaint 2 attacked
only the attachment and not the underlying
2
state civil action.1
The district court, narrowly circumscribing Huffman to its quasi-criminal context, refused to abstain and proceeded to the merits. 23 Holding
several sections of Illinois' attachment statute unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause, the court entered a broad
injunction barring any use of the attachment statute and ordering the
return of the federal plaintiffs' property still subject to attachment. 124 On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
The TrainorCourt recognized that Younger abstention is a by-product
of our dual judicial system with its presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.1 25 The Court then reviewed the general principles distilled from
Younger, Huffman and Juidice. 26 Although the majority appeared to
place renewed emphasis on Younger's largely abandoned equitable rationale, 2 7 its opinion evidenced the Court's firm commitment to the
comity-federalism branch of Younger:
Beyond the accepted rule that equity will ordinarily not enjoin the
prosecution of a crime, however, the Court voiced a "more vital consideration," namely, that in a Union where both the States and the
118. See id. at 436-37.
119. See id. at 438.
120. See id. at 436-37 nn.l-5.
121. See id. at 438.
122. See id. Consequently, it was argued by the federal plaintiffs that federal injunctive
relief would not interfere with the ongoing state civil fraud litigation. See id. at 446 n.9.
Without close analysis, the Court concluded that the attachment was "very much a part
of the underlying action for fraud." Id.
123. See id. at 439.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 440. Justice White stated:
Because our federal and state legal systems have overlapping jurisdiction and
responsibilities, we have frequently inquired into the proper role of a federal
court, in a case pending before it and otherwise within its jurisdiction, when
litigation between the same parties and raising the same issues is or apparently
soon will be pending in a state court. More precisely, when a suit is filed in a
federal court challenging the constitutionality of a state law under the Federal
Constitution and seeking to have state officers enjoined from enforcing it,
should the federal court proceed to judgment when it appears that the State has
already instituted proceedings in the state court to enforce the challenged statute against the federal plaintiff and the latter could tender and have his federal
claims decided in the state court?
Id.
126. See id. at 440-44.
127. See id. at 440-42; see also supra notes 57-60, 70, 98-99 and accompanying text
(discussing Younger's equitable rationale).
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Federal Government are sovereign entities, there are basic concerns of
federalism which counsel against interference by federal courts,
through injunctions or otherwise, with legitimate
state functions, par1 28
ticularly with the operation of state courts.
This language is significant for two reasons. First, it does not distinguish between criminal and civil proceedings. Second, it implies that the
operation of a state court system per se is a legitimate state function that
should not be interfered with by a federal injunction. 2 9 Thus, in Trainor
the Court elevates noninterference with the institutional functioning of a
state judicial0 system to the principal theoretical predicate of Younger
abstention.13
The Court then concluded that "the principles of Younger and
Huffman are broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court
with an ongoing civil enforcement action such as this, brought by the
State in its sovereign capacity."1 31 Finding no Younger exception applicable, 132 the Court reversed the district court on the merits, but remanded for consideration of whether the state attachment proceeding
had afforded an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional defense. 3 3 Although the Trainor Court based abstention on the state's interest in bringing an action in its sovereign capacity to protect state
financial resources, 34 its underlying rationale was predicated on nonin128. Trainor, 431 U.S. at 441 (citation omitted).
129. See id. This was the first time the Court used the term "operation of state courts"
in this context, instead of "criminal case" or "prosecution." See id.; cases cited supra
note 60.
130. See Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 181 (1979), in which
Judge Aldisert of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit states:
Even if the test is conceptualized as "a pronounced state interest," I believe that
a state has a pronounced interest in maintaining the viability and integrity of its
own court system, which I consider to be a fundamental state institution. I do
not agree that there is greater state interest in preserving the integrity of the
executive branch of state government when engaging in a private suit for bill
collection, than in preserving the integrity of the state judiciary against the
charge that its courts are unable to vindicate the federal constitutional rights of
the inhabitants of that state.
Id. at 198 (footnote omitted).
131. Trainor,431 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted).
132. See id. at 446-47.
133. See id. at 447 & n.10; see also id. at 466-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Illinois attachment statute did not afford an adequate remedy). In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens, a former member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, incisively described the limitations of the Illinois attachment statutes. See id. at
466-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On remand, the district court held that the federal plaintiffs lacked an adequate opportunity to challenge the constitutional validity of the attachment under Illinois procedure. See Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516, 518-20 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Quern v. Hernandez, 440 U.S. 951 (1979) (mem.).
134. One commentator criticized the Trainor Court's "emphasis on the presence of the
state as a party to the proceeding," Koury, supra note 7, at 680-81 (footnote omitted),
because "[i]n Trainorit is clear that the state's interest in the attachment proceeding was
more attenuated than those interests encountered in previous cases." Id. at 681.
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terference with a prior pending state judicial proceeding. 135
The next civil extension of Younger came two years later in Moore v.
Sims.'36 As in Huffman and Trainor, the case resulted from a state
agency's attempt to enforce state law. At issue was the Texas Family
Code, which described the "contours of the parent-child relationship and
the permissible areas and modes of state intervention."' 137 After receiving reports of suspected child abuse from school officials, the Texas Department of Human Resources took temporary custody of the federal
plaintiffs' children and instituted a state court action for emergency pro139
tection of the children."3 After participating in the state proceedings,
the parents filed a section 1983 action in federal district court, launching
a broad based attack on the constitutionality of various provisions of the
Texas Family Code."4 Refusing to abstain because the case was complex, involved child custody, and resulted from confusion in the state
courts, the district court addressed the merits, and found various parts of
the Texas statutory scheme unconstitutional. '41 On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed with instructions to dismiss the federal complaint on
remand. 142
Undoubtedly, Texas' strong interest in enforcing its Family Code allowed the Court to bring Moore within the reasoning of Huffman and
Trainor.'4 3 Again the Court emphasized that "[t]he Younger doctrine,
which counsels federal-court abstention when there is a pending state
proceeding, reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state
judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff."'" In addition, the Court expressed concern
that the Texas courts should have the initial opportunity to construe
their own statutory scheme in the face of a broad based constitutional
attack. 145
135. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
136. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
137. Id. at 418.
138. See id. at 419.
139. See id. at 418-22.
140. See id. at 418, 421-23.
141. See id. at 418, 422.
142. See id. at 435.
143. See id. at 427, 435.
144. Id. at 423.
145. See id. at 427-30. The Court invoked Pullman abstention, see Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), to support this point. Under Pullman, federal courts
are required to abstain from deciding constitutional challenges to unclear state statutes,
provided that resort to a state court for a reading of the statute may result in a disposition
on state grounds, thus avoiding a constitutional decision. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
See generally Field, Abstention in ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 1074-1187 (1974) (analyzing Pullman doctrine
and describing its relationship to other abstention doctrines); Comment, The Abstention
Doctrine: Is Pullman Dead in Federal Question Cases?, 30 Baylor L. Rev. 279, 284-89
(1978) (arguing that Juidice and Trainor made Pullman obsolete).
The Moore Court's discussion of Pullman hinted at a merger of the various abstention
doctrines:
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The Moore Court devoted a large part of its opinion to respond to the
district court's conclusion that the federal plaintiffs did not have an adequate opportunity to raise their federal claims in the state judicial system.146 Such an opportunity is of course the most crucial predicate of
Younger abstention.14 7 In language suggesting a strong presumption in
favor of adequate opportunity, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "[c]ertainly, abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of
'
the constitutional claims." 148
In the past the Court had been vigilant in
applying this critical requirement. 149 The Moore Court, however, made
it relatively difficult for a federal plaintiff to150show an inadequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state court.
The Supreme Court continued its expansion of Younger, extending the
doctrine to administrative proceedings in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association,"' in which a state bar discipli1 52
nary proceeding was brought against a member of the New Jersey bar.
The breadth of a challenge to a complex state statutory scheme has traditionally
militated in favor of abstention, not against it. This is evident in a number of
distinct but related lines of abstention cases which, although articulated in different ways, reflect the same sensitivity to the primacy of the State in the interpretation of its own laws and the cost to our federal system of government
inherent in federal-court interpretation and subsequent invalidation of parts of
an integrated statutory framework.
Moore, 442 U.S. at 427. The Pennzoil Court drew Younger and Pullman abstention even
closer together. See infra note 201.
146. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 422, 424-26.
147. See L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 3-30, at 204-05. The Moore majority rejected the
view of the dissenters, as expressed by Justice Stevens, that an adequate opportunity is
not afforded by a state proceeding unless "the constitutional claims may be raised 'as a
defense.'" 442 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority caustically asserted:
The proposition that claims must be cognizable "as a defense" in the ongoing
state proceeding, as put forward by our dissenting Brethren, converts a doctrine
with substantive content into a mere semantical joust. There is no magic in the
term "defense" when used in connection with the Younger doctrine if the word
"defense" is intended to be used as a term of art. We do not here deal with the
long-past niceties which distinguished among "defense," "counterclaims," "setoffs," "recoupments," and the like.
Id. at 430 n.12 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 425-26 (emphasis added); see also id. at 432 ("appellees have not shown that
state procedural law barred presentation of their claims") (emphasis added).
149. See, eg., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977); Kugler v. Helfant, 421
U.S. 117, 124 (1975); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973); see also L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 3-30, at 202, 204-05 & n.13
(critical component of Younger abstention is that "federal litigant... be able to raise the
constitutional claim in the pending state proceeding").
150. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 425-26, 430-31 & nn.12-13.
151. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
152. See id. at 427-28.
The New Jersey Supreme Court had established a three-tiered system to process grievance complaints against members of the state's bar. See id. at 425. Under the scheme,
initial investigation and adjudication of complaints occur at local district ethics committees appointed by the state supreme court. See id. at 425-26. The local committees are
authorized to dismiss the complaint, issue a confidential written reprimand, or forward
the case to the Disciplinary Review Board for further consideration. See id. at 427. The
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At the time of the events in question, the rules for licensing and disciplining attorneys did not specifically
provide for constitutional challenges to
15 3
the disciplinary process.
The disciplinary proceeding was commenced against a member of the
New Jersey bar by a district committee.1 54 Rather than responding
within the administrative framework, the attorney filed a federal action
contending that the state disciplinary rules violated the first amendment. 15 ' The district court abstained on Younger grounds, and after reopening the case to ascertain if any Younger exceptions applied, the court
adhered to its initial ruling and dismissed the complaint.' 56 Finding that
the state bar disciplinary proceedings failed to provide a meaningful opportunity to raise and adjudicate constitutional claims, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.'5 7 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.
New Jersey's strong state interest in the licensing and disciplining of its
attorneys was undoubtedly sufficient under prior case law to trigger
Younger abstention. 5 s The only seriously contested issue was whether
there was a meaningful opportunity to raise federal constitutional objections within the state attorney disciplinary system. Continuing the presumption in favor of finding an adequate opportunity, first articulated in
Moore, 159 the Court found that the federal plaintiff failed to establish that
the local committee would have refused to consider a 60
first amendment
challenge to the disciplinary rules had one been made.'
Review Board, which undertakes a de novo review, must submit findings and recommendations to the New Jersey Supreme Court. See id.
153. See id. at 430 n.8.
154. See id. at 427-28; supra note 152.
155. See Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 429.
156. See id.
157. See id. Middlesex County was decided after the three-judge court statute was
amended. See supra note 54. Hence, the appeal from the single district judge went to the
court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
158. See Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 434. The Court stated:
The State of New Jersey has an extremely important interest in maintaining
and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses. States traditionally have exercised extensive control over the professional conduct of attorneys ....
The judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon professionally
ethical conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant interest in assuring and
maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys engaged in practice. The
State's interest in the professional conduct of attorneys involved in the administration of criminal justice is of special importance.
Id. (citations omitted).
159. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
160. The Court stated:
[The federal plaintiff] contends that there was no opportunity in the state
disciplinary proceedings to raise his federal constitutional challenge to the disciplinary rules. Yet [he] failed to respond to the complaint filed by the local
Ethics Committee and failed even to attempt to raise any federal constitutional
challenge in the state proceedings. Under New Jersey's procedure, its Ethics
Committees constantly are called upon to interpret the state disciplinary rules.
[Plaintiff] points to nothing existing at the time the complaint was brought by
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The Supreme Court's final 16 1 pre-Pennzoil civil extension of Younger
was Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,162
which, like Middlesex County, arose in the context of a state administrative proceeding. In Dayton Christian Schools a teacher was advised that
her contract to teach at a sectarian day school would not be renewed
because she was pregnant and the policy of the school required mothers
of preschool age children to remain at home.16 3 Rather than appealing
the nonrenewal decision internally, the teacher threatened litigation
based on state and federal sex discrimination laws. 1 In response, the
school board terminated the teacher's employment. 6 5 The teacher filed
a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, alleging that Dayton's nonrenewal decision constituted sex discrimination in violation of
Ohio law, and that the board's
termination decision unlawfully penalized
66
her for asserting her rights.
After several rounds of preliminary procedural skirmishes, 6 7 the
Commission filed a complaint against the school, initiating formal administrative proceedings. 16 1 While these proceedings were pending, the
school brought a section 1983 action in federal district court seeking to
enjoin the state administrative proceedings on the ground that the first
amendment prohibited the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over
it or punishing it for engaging in employment discrimination.169 The district court denied the injunction on the ground that the first amendment
challenge was not ripe. 170 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed, holding that the exercise of jurisdiction and the enforcement of
Ohio discrimination laws "would impermissibly burden [the school's]
rights under the Free Exercise Clause and would result in excessive entanglement under the Establishment Clause.171
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court was divided,
however, on the appropriate ground for reversal. A majority of five justices held that the Younger doctrine, which was previously extended to
the local Committee to indicate that the members of the Ethics Committee, the
majority of whom are lawyers, would have refused to consider a claim that the
rules which they were enforcing violated federal constitutional guarantees.
Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 435.
161. In dictum, the Court discussed Younger's civil branch in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1984).
162. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
163. See id. at 623.

164. See id.
165. See id. Later the board rescinded its earlier nonrenewal decision because the
teacher had not received adequate prior notice of the school's policy concerning mothers
with young children, see id., and asserted that the termination was based solely on her
failure to comply with the internal dispute resolution procedures, see id.
166. See id. at 623-24.
167. See id. at 624.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 621, 624-25.
170. See id. at 621-22.
171. Id. at 622.
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state civil and administrative proceedings, required the district court to
abstain. 172 After reviewing the general principles derived from Younger
and its previous civil extensions, which permit abstention when important state interests are at stake, the Court concluded that those principles
governed Dayton Christian Schools. 173 The Court's opinion reaffirmed
that all that is required to trigger the Younger doctrine is a vital state
interest and a prior pending state proceeding in which an adequate opportunity is afforded to raise federal claims. In Dayton ChristianSchools,
both criteria were easily satisfied. As the Court conclusorily stated: "We
have no doubt that the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a
sufficiently important state interest to bring the present case within the
ambit of [Younger]. We also have no reason to doubt that Dayton will
receive an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims." 74
To the extent that the Court has articulated the doctrinal foundations
of Younger civil abstention, it did so in Huffman, Juidice and Trainor.' s
The remainder of Younger's pre-Pennzoil civil progeny merely applied
the doctrine conclusorily.
By the time it heard Pennzoil, the Court had extended the Younger
doctrine, originally rooted in the criminal context, to state civil and administrative proceedings pertaining to enforcement of quasi-criminal nuisance laws,' 7 6 the judicial contempt process,177 the fiscal integrity of a
state welfare system, 178 the protection of abused children, '7 the disciplining of professionals, 80 and employment discrimination.' 8 ' Reluctant
to jettison the theoretical moorings of Younger from the criminal context, 8 2 the Court found important, substantial, or vital state interests at
172. See id. at 625-29. Justice Stevens, writing for four justices, concurred in the result, but disagreed with the majority regarding the applicability of Younger. Stevens'
opinion agreed with the district court that the first amendment challenge was not ripe for
adjudication because the Commission could dismiss the teacher's complaint after a hearing. See id. at 632-33 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 626-28.
174. Id. at 628.
175. See supra notes 71-80, 87-135 and accompanying text.
176. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
177. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); supra notes 103-15 and accompanying
text.
178. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
179. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); supra notes 136-50 and accompanying
text.
180. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982); supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
181. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986);
supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
182. A vital state interest is involved when a state enforces its criminal laws. See Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the
Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1051, 1075 (1988). Continued emphasis on vital state interests by Younger's civil progeny enabled the civil extensions to
achieve consistency with the criminal origins of the doctrine. Cf Althouse, supra, at
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stake in each of these prior civil applications of Younger. 183 The state, or
more accurately a state agent or agency, was the plaintiff in each of these
prior civil applications of Younger. In each instance the state agency had
prosecuted a civil enforcement action before a state court or administrative agency. As the Second Circuit observed in affirming the district
court injunction in Pennzoil, "[t]he state interests at stake in this proceeding differ in both kind and degree from those present in the six cases in
which the Supreme Court held that Younger applied."18' 4 Although the
Second Circuit correctly analyzed the common conceptual theme of
Younger's prior civil progeny and the theme's inapplicability to Pennzoil,
it inaccurately concluded that abstention was unwarranted.
III.

THE PENNZOIL LITIGATION

Competing tender offers for Getty Oil Company' touched off litigation between Pennzoil and Texaco in the state courts of Delaware' 86 and
Texas. 1 87 After Texaco won the acquisition contest, it found itself a defendant in an action filed by Pennzoil in a Texas state court. 88 Alleging
that Texaco had tortiously induced Getty to breach its contract with
Pennzoil, 8 9 the complaint sought actual damages of $7.53 billion and a
like amount of punitive damages. The state court jury returned a verdict
of $7.53 billion of actual and $3 billion of punitive damages. Counting
prejudgment interest, the judgment would have exceeded $11 billion. 90
Texas law permitted Pennzoil to execute the judgment pending appeal
unless Texaco, the judgment debtor, filed a supersedeas bond in an
amount at least equal to the "judgment, interest and costs."'' Texaco
1078 (discussing Court's development of state interest analysis in Younger's civil
progeny).
183. See Althouse, supra note 182, at 1077-78; supra notes 113-14, 128-30, 143-44, 158,
173-74 and accompanying text.
184. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1149 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
185. For background on the underlying corporate transactions, see T. Petzinger, Oil &
Honor: The Texaco-Pennzoil Wars (1987); Gelfand, "Pun'sOil Sues Toxico" A Comedy
of Errors in (At Least) FourActs, 11 Del. J. Corp. L. 345 (1986); Comment, Texaco Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court
Proceedings, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 767, 767 n.4 (1986).
186. The Delaware litigation is discussed in Gelfand, supra note 185, at 349-55.
187. The Texas state court litigation is discussed in Gelfand, supra note 185, at 355-60;
Comment, supra note 185, at 768-69 & nn.7-12.
188. See supra note 187.
189. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 4. For analysis of the problems relating to agreements in
principle in the merger and acquisition context, see Note, The $10.53 Billion QuestionWhen Are the PartiesBound?: Pennzoil and the Use ofAgreements in Principlein Mergers and Acquisitions, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1367, 1370-77 (1987).
190. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 4.
191. Id. at 5 (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(b)). For discussion and analysis of the constitutionality of the Texas supersedeas bond requirement, see Carlson, Mandatory SupersedeasBond Requirements-A Denial of Due ProcessRights?, 39 Baylor L. Rev. 29, 33-49
(1987); see also Note, Expandingthe Due ProcessRights of Indigent Litigants: Will Tex-
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could not post the required bond. 19 2 Immediately prior to the entry of
judgment, Texaco, without raising any federal claims in the state court,
filed a section 1983 action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. 193 The federal complaint raised several
constitutional and federal statutory claims attacking the state court judgment and the Texas bond and lien procedures, and sought to enjoin

Pennzoil from enforcing the judgment. 194 The district court issued a pre-

liminary injunction.19 5 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed, but limited its affirmance to the district
court's holding that the Texas post-judgment bond and lien provisions
were unconstitutional as applied. 196 The Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction 9 7 and reversed.
Although the Court unanimously concluded that Texaco was not entitled to federal relief, it split five different ways in six separate opinions
regarding the proper rationale for its conclusion. Justice Powell wrote
the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor and Scalia. By a bare majority, the Court held that the
district court should have abstained under the Younger abstention doctrine.' 98 Except for Justice Scalia, who wrote a brief separate opinion
responding to Justice Marshall, 199 the other concurring Justices found
Younger inapplicable, but would have denied Texaco federal relief on
other grounds.2 °
aco Trickle Down?, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 463, 501-04 (1986) (arguing that Texas' bond
requirement violated Texaco's constitutional rights).
192. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "[i]t is estimated that the
world-wide surety bond capacity ranges from $1 billion to $1.5 billion under the best
possible circumstances." Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir.
1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
193. Texaco filed its complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in White Plains, New York, the location of Texaco's corporate
headquarters. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 6.
194. See id. & n.6.
195. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 261-62 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
196. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481
U.S. 1 (1987). For commentaries on the Second Circuit opinion, see Lushing, Texaco v.
Pennzoil: The Use and Creation of Precedentby the Second Circuit, 11 T. Marshall L.J.
289 (1986); Comment, supra note 186; Casenote, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a
Crude Analysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine'sPreclusion of FederalJurisdiction,41
U. Miami L. Rev. 627 (1987).
197. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982).
198. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10. For early commentary on the Supreme Court opinion,
see Edwards, supra note 62, at 1033-36; Comment, supra note 12; Note, The Ultimate
Expansion of the Younger Doctrine: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 41 Sw. L.J. 1055
(1987).
199. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, expressed the view that the RookerFeldman doctrine, see infra note 200, did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction
because, in resolving the dispute over the Texas post-judgment enforcement statutes, "the
Court need not decide any issue either actually litigated in the Texas courts or inextricably intertwined with issues so litigated." Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
200. Justice Marshall would have invoked the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see District
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In extending Younger to a section 1983 case seeking relief against the
enforcement of a state court judgment, Pennzoil articulated a test with
strong links to federalism and comity:
This concern mandates application of Younger abstention not only
when the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when certain
civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the proceeding
are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government.20 1
In concluding that Texas' interests were critically implicated in
Pennzoil, the Court relied principally on Juidice v. Vail,20 2 which held
that a federal court could not enjoin state court judges from enforcing
state civil judgments through use of the contempt process.20 3 The Court,
in Pennzoil, stated that Juidice "rest[ed] on the importance to the States
of enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts. '' 20 4 Justice Powell
found "little difference between the State's interest in forcing persons to
transfer property in response to a court's judgment and in forcing persons to respond to the court's process on pain of contempt. ' 20 1 Justice
Powell invoked Juidice to fulfill the important, substantial, or vital state
interest requirement derived from the Court's prior civil applications of
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), which prohibits lower federal courts from hearing federal cases
that are, in effect, appeals from a state judicial system. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 24-26.
For discussion and analysis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its application in
Pennzoil, see Comment, supra note 185, at 777-83; Casenote, supra note 196.
Justice Blackmun would have invoked Pullman abstention, which would have required
Texaco to obtain a decision from the Texas courts regarding the scope and applicability
of the Texas post-judgment enforcement statutes. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 29; supra note
145; infra note 201.
Justices Brennan and Stevens would have denied relief to Texaco on the merits of its
federal constitutional claims. See 481 U.S. at 18-22, 29-34.
201. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11. In addition to restating the Younger civil abstention test,
the Court, in a footnote, rejected application of Pullman abstention, because Pennzoil
failed to argue it. See id. n.9. In doing so, the Court may have foreshadowed a potential
merger of Pullman and Younger, and perhaps other forms of abstention, when it stated:
We merely note that considerations similar to those that mandate Pullman abstention are relevant to a court's decision whether to abstain under Younger.
The various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal
courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of considerations
designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates parallel
judicial processes.
Id. (citation omitted).
One commentator recently expressed the view that "this footnote holds the potential
for much greater deference to the state courts under principles of federalism and comity."
Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptionsfor Relief, 51 Alb. L.

Rev. 151, 164 (1987) (footnote omitted); see also supra note 145 (earlier hint by Court of
possible merger of Pullman and Younger abstention).
202. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
203. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
204. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13.
205. Id.
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Younger.u" 6 His reliance on Juidice, however, was misplaced. Juidice
was distinguishable even though the underlying litigation also was between purely private parties. The invocation of the contempt process
implicates a state interest that is markedly different from the state interest in the enforcement of a private civil judgment.2 0 7 The Juidice Court
recognized this, finding that federal interference with the state contempt
process could be as offensive as interference with a state criminal prosecution.20 s Subsequently, in Trainor,the Court drew an analogy between
judicial contempt proceedings and state civil enforcement actions.20 9
Once an order of contempt is entered, the state becomes an interested
party in the litigation, not only to enforce a private judgment, but, more
significantly, to defend and maintain its judicial system.21 ° In contrast to
the contempt process at issue in Juidice, Texas' post-judgment bond, lien
and execution statutes involved in Pennzoil are invoked by private litigants with minimal involvement by the state.2 z Indeed, the state's interest in its post-judgment enforcement statutes is no different from its
interest in rules of court, evidence or any other procedural matter.2 12
Accordingly, Pennzoil, stripped of its superficial analogy to Juidice, is an
application of Younger abstention to purely private litigation.
206. See id. at 12-13; supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text; infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
208. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S 327, 335-36 (1977), in which the Court observed that
"[c]ontempt in these cases, serves, of course, to vindicate and preserve the private interests of competing litigants, but its purpose is by no means spent upon purely private
concerns. It stands in aid of the authority of the judicialsystem, so that its orders and
judgments are not rendered nugatory." Id. at 336 n.12 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
209. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443-44 (1977).
210. See Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335; supra notes 113-14, 204-08 and accompanying text.
211. See Althouse, supra note 182, at 1081. Justice Brennan described Texas' relatively weak interest in his concurring opinion: "The State's interest in this case is negligible. The State of Texas-not a party in this appeal-expressly represented to the Court
of Appeals that it 'has no interest in the outcome of the state-court adjudication underlying this cause,' except in its fair adjudication." 481 U.S. at 19 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). Additionally, Justice Brennan astutely observed that "the interest in
enforcing the bond and lien requirement is privately held by Pennzoil, not by the State of
Texas." Id. at 20. Moreover, "Pennzoil was free to waive the bond and lien requirements
under Texas law, without asking the State of Texas for permission." Id. (citations
omitted).
212. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 30 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens persuasively asserts that in prior civil applications of Younger, the Court has "invariably required that the State have a substantive interest in the ongoing proceeding, an interest
that goes beyond its interest as adjudicator of wholly private disputes." Id. Thus, he
concludes: "By abandoning this critical limitation, the Court cuts the Younger doctrine
adrift from its original doctrinal moorings which dealt with the States' interest in enforcing their criminal laws, and the federal courts' longstanding reluctance to interfere with
such proceedings." Id. Justice Stevens' observation is, in part, specious insofar as it refers
only to Younger's criminal moorings, and the well-settled equitable policy of noninterference with "such proceedings." This ignores, however, that Younger was also grounded
on the more vital considerations of comity and federalism, which are not limited to criminal proceedings. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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Having applied Younger to wholly private litigation with no discernable state interest at stake, there is no logical basis on which to limit the
doctrine to criminal and civil enforcement actions. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should forthrightly acknowledge that Pennzoil represents

the full civil maturity of Younger.
IV.

YOUNGER ABSTENTION SHOULD APPLY TO ALL PENDING
STATE PROCEEDINGS

It is axiomatic to American judicial federalism that state and federal
courts should be independent of one another. Complete autonomy is not
feasible, however, in a system with overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction. 21 3 Moreover, with few exceptions, 21 4 federal oversight of state
courts is intended to come on direct review by the Supreme Court, 215 and
not on collateral review by lower federal courts. The first Congress was
sufficiently concerned about federal intrusion into state judicial process
that it passed the Anti-Injunction Act,2" 6 which in relevant part provided
213. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962); Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). See generally M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at
109-15 (discussing state court adjudication of federal claims and how interests of federalism will be best served).
214. The principal exception is federal habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255
(1982). In the last two decades, however, the Court has substantially reduced the availability of federal habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring federal court to dismiss habeas applications if they contain both exhausted and
unexhausted claims); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 489-96 (1976) (limiting
habeas review of fourth amendment claims).
215. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351-59 (1816); cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1958) (discussing state's obligation to obey decisions of Supreme Court under supremacy
clause). But cf 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (West Supp. 1989) (replacing automatic appeal to
Supreme Court from state court judgments with discretionary review by certiorari). See
generally Warren, Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States: A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the JudiciaryAct, 47 Am. L. Rev. 1
(1913) (discussing Supreme Court's jurisdiction over appeals from state court).
216. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334-35. Just last term in Chick
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988), the Supreme Court reiterated the
fundamental policy rationale underlying the Anti-Injunction Statute:
The Act... is a necessary concomitant of the Framers' decision to authorize,
and Congress' decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts.
It represents Congress' considered judgment as to how to balance the tensions
inherent in such a system. Prevention of frequent federal court intervention is
important to make the dual system work effectively. By generally barring such
intervention, the Act forestalls "the inevitable friction between the state and
federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial proceedings by a
federal court." Due in no small part to the fundamental constitutional independence of the States, Congress adopted a general policy under which state proceedings "should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention
of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state
appellate courts and ultimately this Court."
Id. at 1689 (citation omitted) (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970)). See generally Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717 (1977) (describing history of, and analyzing
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that "[no] ...writ of injunction [may] be granted to stay proceedings in
any court of a state.

' 2 17

For almost two centuries, federal courts oper-

ated under the constraining influence of this simple legislative directive.
The traditional relationship between state and federal courts was
threatened, however, by the possibility that section 1983 was an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute. 21 s The potential clash between the Anti-Injunction Act and section 1983 was not
evident until Monroe v. Pape,2 19 which resuscitated section 1983 from its
long dormancy. The newly invigorated section 1983 had the potential
not only to reverse the long-settled prohibition of federal injunctive relief
against state prosecutions, but, more significantly, threatened to completely subvert the Anti-Injunction Act. 2
Unrestrained use of section 1983 would allow federal courts to interfere with, and collaterally review, the judgments of state courts. Such
federal oversight is potentially broader in scope and more intrusive than
collateral review in habeas corpus proceedings. 22 1 The application of the
exceptions to, Anti-Injunction Act). The principal commentaries on the Anti-Injunction
Act are collected in Theis, supra note 1, at 113 n.42.
217. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
218. The current version of the anti-injunction statute, enacted in 1948, provides: "A
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982); cf Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 294-95
(1970) (Anti-Injunction Act absolutely bars federal interference with state proceedings,
civil or criminal).
219. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. After Monroe
opened the federal courthouse door to section 1983, litigants could attack state court
proceedings on the ground that they violated federally protected rights. Typically, a litigant claiming violation of federal rights would seek federal injunctive or declaratory relief
under section 1983. If the anti-injunction statute did not apply to section 1983, there
would be nothing to prevent direct federal interference with a properly pending state
litigation.
220. Professor Weinberg expressed this concern as follows:
Moreover, the exception could annihilate the rule. Any state judicial proceeding may be couched as a section 1983 deprivation on the theory that what a
state court does is state action. Wholly private cases conceivably could be
scooped out of the state courts and into the federal judicial system. That certainly could happen if the federal plaintiff alleged a state judicial denial of procedural due process. It also could happen ifjudicial enforcement of state tort or
contract law was thought to infringe substantive first amendment and other
civil rights. But it could also happen, potentially, if judicial enforcement of
state law was alleged to deny the federal plaintiff substantive due process in the
sense in which the railroad argued in Ex parte Young that the state ratemaking
was so arbitrary and confiscatory as to deny it due process of law. The result
could be total federal control over state adjudications, public and private, destroying any significant independent role for the state tribunals in our federal
system.
Weinberg, supra note 52, at 1210 (footnotes omitted).
221. Federal habeas corpus requires exhaustion of state remedies. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)-(c) (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 (1982). There is no similar requirement under section 1983. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-01
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Younger doctrine to all pending state actions ensures the adjudication of
cases properly pending before state courts without federal interference.
In every civil application of Younger by the Supreme Court, a federal
defense arose in the context of a state-created cause of action properly
pending in a state court or administrative agency. 222 In each instance,
rather than raising the federal defense in the pending state proceeding,
the federal plaintiff invoked section 1983 to obtain a federal decision on
the defense, and in the process disrupted the ongoing state proceeding.
Application of Younger in these circumstances prevents this disruption.
Thus, the Younger doctrine can function as a judicially created forumallocation device.
Concern about federal disruption of a prior, properly pending state
proceeding is implicated whether the proceeding is denominated criminal, civil enforcement or private civil. Why, then, has the Supreme
Court been reluctant to acknowledge expressly that Younger applies to
all prior pending state proceedings? One explanation for the Court's reluctance is that two of the four underlying policy rationales2 23 for
Younger abstention are not readily applicable to private civil litigation.2 24
All four rationales, however, apply to the quasi-criminal and civil enforcement actions previously recognized by the Court as appropriate civil
applications of Younger. All four rationales are implicated whether the
state proceeds civilly or criminally to enforce its substantive interests.
Only the first and fourth, however, are readily applicable to private civil
226
litigation.22 5 Even Professor Redish, who is no advocate of abstention,
has argued that the second and third rationales are subject to substantial
criticism, and that the most important rationale is the fourth-avoiding
interference with the orderly operation of the state judicial system.2 27
(1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). See generally P. Low & J. Jeffries,
supra note 10, at 1064-72 (discussing exhaustion of state remedies under section 1983).
222. See supra Part II.
223. As discussed earlier, see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text, Professor Redish identified these rationales as follows:
(1) The desire to avoid affronting state judges by questioning their competence
and/or willingness to enforce constitutional rights; (2) the need to prevent federal judicial interference with the accomplishment of state substantive legislative goals; (3) the need to preserve the discretion of state executive officers in
general and state prosecutors in particular, and (4) the desire to prevent federal
interference with the orderly operation of the state judicial process.
M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 298.
224. See supra notes 75-76, 84-85 and accompanying text; infra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
225. It is theoretically possible for a substantive state interest to be implicated in private civil litigation. In addition, the state has an interest in the fair adjudication of disputes between private parties. However, the state's substantive interest in a dispute
realistically is only implicated when the state is a party. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
226. See Redish, supra note 10, at 72-75, 114-15; Redish, supra note 8, at 487-88.
227. See M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 298-302; Redish, supra note 8, at 46871,477-80.
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The fourth rationale, essentially a combination of the previous three,2 2 is
equally as applicable to private civil litigation as it is to criminal, quasicriminal or civil enforcement litigation.
Commentators have criticized Younger's concern with state substantive policy and state executive branch discretion.22 9 While the first and
fourth Younger rationales are implicated only when there is a prior pending state proceeding,"' the state has an interest in its substantive policies
and the discretion of its executive branch officers irrespective of whether
there is a prior pending state proceeding implicating these interests. Accordingly, these interests may be interfered with by federal declaratory2 or
3
injunctive relief even in the absence of a prior pending proceeding.
The Court has expressly permitted federal interference with state substantive policy and executive branch discretion in the absence of a prior
pending proceeding. 3 2 In Steffel v. Thompson2 33 the Court allowed such
interference because "the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.' ,,234
Justice Brennan elaborated this point in Steffel:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal
complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative
legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor
can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional
principles.2 35

Because a state's interest in both its substantive policy and the discretion of its executive branch officers is implicated regardless of whether
there is a prior pending state proceeding, this interest cannot stand as
part of the theoretical foundation of Younger.236 The practical effect of
228. See M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 302; Redish, supra note 8, at 472.
229. See M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 300-01; Redish supra note 8, at 473-80;
Comment, supra note 9, at 1343-44.
230. It is possible to argue that the state judicial process is undermined by federal
interference even in the absence of a pending proceeding. But, any such interference
would be indirect, and would not impugn the integrity of the state judicial system with
respect to enforcement of federal rights.
231. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
232. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930-34 (1975) (permitting preliminary injunctive relief against seriously threatened but not pending proceedings); infra
notes 233-35 and accompanying text (permitting declaratory relief).
233. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
234. Id. at 462 (quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509

(1972)).
235. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462. Additionally, in the absence of pending proceedings, a
potential state court defendant has no forum to present constitutional or other federal
claims unless state declaratory judgments are permitted. See M. Redish, Tensions, supra
note 6, at 308 & n. 112. But even if state declaratory judgment procedure is available, it is
well-settled that a section 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies. See supra note

221.
236. For an analysis of the impact of Steffel on the theoretical foundations of Younger,
see M. Redish, Tensions, supra note 6, at 307-11; Redish, supra note 8, at 474-77.

The Court, however, substantially reduced the significance of Steffel in Hicks v. Mi-
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this analysis is that by narrowing Younger's theoretical underpinning the
doctrine's scope has expanded 237 so that Younger now applies to all prior
pending state litigation.
In articulating the fourth rationale-noninterference with the state judicial process-for Younger abstention, Justice Black drew heavily on the
Anti-Injunction Act, 238 which is equally applicable to civil and criminal
litigation.23 9 When Younger was decided, the Court had not yet determined that section 1983 was a congressionally authorized exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act. 2' If the Anti-Injunction Act had applied, it
would have foreclosed federal interference with state civil and criminal
cases. As if anticipating its holding the next term in Mitchum v. Foster,241 which found that section 1983 was an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute,24 2 the Court developed the
Younger doctrine to ameliorate the perceived harmful effect to federalism
of a blanket exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. While some commentators view the tension between section 1983 and the Anti-Injunction Act
after Mitchum as irreconcilable,2 4 3 one writer attempted the following
randa, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). In Hicks, the Court applied Younger to a state criminal
prosecution commenced after the federal section 1983 action, justifying the result on the
ground that no substantive proceedings on the merits had taken place in the federal action when the prosecution commenced. See Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349. Although the Court
has not yet applied Hicks to civil cases, it has implied that it would do so in the civil
enforcement context. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984)
(dictum).
237. See Redish, supra note 8, at 481. Professor Redish stated that such expansion
would be paradoxical.
238. Justice Black observed:
Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few
exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from
interference by federal courts. In 1793 an Act unconditionally provided:
"IN]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state . . . ." I Stat. 335, c. 22, § 5. A comparison of the 1793 Act with 28
U.S.C. § 2283, its present-day successor, graphically illustrates how few and
minor have been the exceptions granted from the flat, prohibitory language of
the old Act. During all this lapse of years from 1793 to 1970 the statutory
exceptions to the 1793 congressional enactment have been only three: (1) "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress"; (2) "where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction"; and (3) "to protect or effectuate its judgments." In addition, a
judicial exception to the longstanding policy evidenced by the statute has been
made where a person about to be prosecuted in a state court can show that he
will, if the proceeding in the state court is not enjoined, suffer irreparable
damages.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
239. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
240. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
241. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
242. Id. at 243.
243. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 52, at 1211-12. Professor Weinberg offers the following cynical analysis:
And so the real explanation for "Our Federalism" surfaces: It obliterates
section 1983 as a threat to established patterns of judicial federalism; the Court
decided Younger as it did because Mitchum was waiting in the wings. After
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reconciliation:
[A]lthough Congress' distrust of the state courts in civil rights cases is
sufficiently strong to exempt such cases from the Anti-Injunction Statute's presumption againstfederal court restraint of state court proceedings, that distrust is not sufficiently strong
to create a presumption in
2 44
favor of such federal court interference.

Without Younger, there would be a presumption in favor of federal interference. Moreover, application of Younger to any prior pending state
civil action would not, as suggested by Justice Brennan and certain commentators,2 45 represent an implicit overruling of Mitchum. Those espousing implicit overruling rely almost exclusively on the presumed
intent of the Reconstruction Congress to allow federal intervention into
the state judicial process.24 6 Though Congress intended federal intrusion
to remedy the lingering effects of slavery in the South, there is substantial
scholarly debate regarding the scope of any permissible intrusion.24 7 In
any event, the conflict between the anti-injunction statute and section
1983 ultimately comes down to a debate about the soundness of
Mitchum, which, in turn, ultimately comes down to a debate about the
intent of the Reconstruction Congress in 1871. 248 Neither the Court nor
the commentators have ever been able to resolve these issues, and it is
unlikely that they ever will. 24 9 Consequently, generalized attacks on
Younger's application to civil litigation based on perceived inconsistency
with Mitchum are not dispositive of the issue of Younger's civil
application.
Prior to Pennzoil, one commentator asserted that any extension of
Younger to private civil litigation would be unwarranted for two reasons."' First, he argued that while Younger may be justified in the crimYounger the Court could decide Mitchum without fear of opening any new jurisdictional doors other than those it was prepared to open.
Id. at 1212.
244. Bartels, supra note 4, at 49.
245. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 456 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 344 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 618 (1975) (Brennan, ., dissenting); Redish, supra note 8, at 48485; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 52, 218-19 (1972); Weinberg, supra
note 52, at 1211-12.
246. See sources cited supra note 245.
247. See infra note 248.
248. Cf. Nichol, supra note 9, at 985 (arguing that, although section 1983 was designed
to be extremely intrusive, its scope was exceedingly narrow). Compare Zeigler, supra
note 4, at 1020-43 (arguing that Younger and its progeny directly contravene the intent of
the Reconstruction Congresses) with Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundationsand
an EmpiricalStudy, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 482, 484-87 (1982) (suggesting that the Court has
failed to acknowledge that there are competing visions of section 1983) and Wells, supra
note 19, at 1103-07 (suggesting that the Court misread the legislative history of section
1983 to expand its scope beyond its original purpose). See generally Logan, supra note
38, at 479-515 (reviewing legislative history of the Reconstruction Congress' civil rights
legislation).
249. See sources cited supra notes 245, 248.
250. See Edwards, supra note 62, at 1021.
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inal context due to the availability of federal post-conviction relief,
because no similar federal remedy is available on the civil side,2"' the
Younger doctrine should not apply. Second, he maintained that Younger
should not apply to private civil litigation because the proceedings are
not initiated by the state as they are in the criminal or civil enforcement
contexts.2 52 Neither of these arguments precludes application of
Younger to private civil litigation. Although obviously true, the latter
point lacks any significance. If Younger is intended primarily to reduce
federal disruption of a properly pending state proceeding, it is irrelevant
whether the state is a party to that proceeding. 25 3 As to the former point,
if the absence of post-judgment relief, such as habeas corpus, is not sufficient to preclude application of Younger to state civil enforcement proceedings, afortioriit should not preclude Younger's application to purely
private civil litigation. Accordingly, the argument against application of
Younger to private civil litigation because of the lack of a federal postjudgment relitigation alternative is specious.25 4
Contrary to the vague fears of many critics, 25 5 application of Younger
to civil cases between private parties will not result in a wholesale abdication of federal authority in such cases. In general, application of Younger
to private litigation will be limited to the preliminary relief and postjudgment enforcement stages of a litigation.2 56 As recognized by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,25 7 and the concurring opinion
of Justice Stevens 2 8 in Pennzoil, a section 1983 claim may only be maintained if the litigant can establish "deprivation (1) of a right 'secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States', (2) by a defendant acting
under color of state law."259 Applying the two-step analysis of Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co.26 0 to test the second element of the section 1983
claim in Pennzoil, the Second Circuit found that "[t]o enforce the judgment, Pennzoil would have to act jointly with state agents by calling on
251. See id.
252. See id. at 1017-18.

253. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
254. Moreover, since Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which removed fourth
amendment claims from the ambit of federal habeas corpus, the scope of habeas corpus
review has been substantially reduced. See id. at 494-95. But cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986) (refusing to extend Stone to the sixth amendment).
255. See sources cited supra note 245.
256. This is not to suggest that application of Younger in private civil litigation is unimportant, or should not be carefully scrutinized, merely because it is restricted to the
preliminary relief and enforcement stages of a litigation. It should be recognized, however, that opportunities to invoke Younger are more limited in private civil cases than in
criminal or civil enforcement litigation.
257. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481
U.S. 1 (1987).
258. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 30 & n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
259. Pennzoil, 784 F.2d at 1145 (emphasis added) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978)).
260. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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state officials to attach and seize Texaco's assets," 2 6 ' and, consequently,
concluded that the "[e]nforcement of the state court judgment therefore
necessarily involves a panoply of activities undertaken together by
Pennzoil and state officials, which constitutes joint action for the purposes of § 1983. ' '262 Accordingly, the required action under state law for
invoking section 1983 realistically can occur only in private civil litigation during the preliminary relief or post-judgment enforcement phases
of a litigation, when private parties would necessarily require assistance
of state agents in obtaining relief. It would be offensive to federalism for
a federal court to intrude into the state judicial process at these stages of
litigation. Application of the Younger doctrine would prevent this interference, and would allow a state court to provide "a forum competent to
vindicate any constitutional objections interposed"2'6 3 at the pre- and
post-trial stages of private litigation.
The argument that Younger is a judicially-created forum allocation device, which is central to the thesis of this Article, was in some measure
buttressed by the Supreme Court last term in Deakins v. Monaghan.2 "
Although the Court expressly declined to decide if Younger applies to an
action seeking only money damages, 2 65 it affirmed reversal of a district
court dismissal under Younger of claims for monetary relief that could
not be raised in a state criminal proceeding. 6 6 It did so in language
strongly supportive of parallel federal jurisdiction in cases seeking only
monetary relief.2 67 Parallel jurisdiction in cases seeking only monetary
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Pennzoil, 784 F.2d at 1145.
Id. at 1146.
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
108 S. Ct. 523 (1988).
See id. at 529.
See id. at 531.
See id. at 530. Justice Blackmun observed:
In reversing the District Court's dismissal of the claims for damages and attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals applied the Third Circuit rule that requires a
District Court to stay rather than dismiss claims that are not cognizable in the
parallel state proceeding. The Third Circuit rule is sound. It allows a parallel
state proceeding to go forward without interference from its federal sibling,
while enforcing the duty of federal courts "to assume jurisdiction where jurisdiction properly exists." This Court repeatedly has stated that the federal
courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise their jurisdiction except in those extraordinary circumstances "'where the order to the parties to
repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.'
We are unpersuaded by petitioners' suggestion that this case presents such
extraordinary circumstances. First, petitioners' speculation that the District
Court, if allowed to retain jurisdiction, would "hover" about the state proceeding, ready to lift the stay whenever it concluded that things were proceeding
unsatisfactorily, is groundless. Petitioners seem to assume that the District
Court would not hold up its end of the comity bargain-an assumption as inappropriate as the converse assumption that the States cannot be trusted to enforce federal rights with adequate diligence ....
Finally, petitioners argue that allowing the District Court to dismiss the complaint will prevent the piecemeal litigation of the dispute between the parties.
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relief would generally not offend Younger principles, because such proceedings could in theory2 6go
forward without directly interfering with any
8
ongoing state litigation.

Additional support for the full civil application of Younger may be
found in the dramatic improvement of our state courts in the last fifteen
to twenty years.269 Between the close of the Civil War and the end of the
era of civil rights activism, roughly the hundred-year period between
1870 and 1970, state courts frequently failed to enforce federal rights.2 7 °
Indeed, state courts often deliberately thwarted federal rights.27 1 In such
a climate it was understandable that federal courts would interfere with
state court adjudication. Although there is substantial debate on the issue of state court competence to enforce federal rights,27 2 most observers
would agree that state courts now take seriously their obligation under
But the involvement of the federal courts cannot be blamed for the fragmentary
nature of the proceedings in this litigation. Because the state criminal proceeding can provide only equitable relief, any action for damages would necessarily
be separate. Indeed, the state forum in which petitioners invite respondents to
pursue their claims for monetary relief clearly would require the initiation of a
separate action.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
268. The Deakins Court approved the Third Circuit rule under which a federal damage action is stayed rather than dismissed pending resolution of a state prosecution in
which monetary relief is not available. See 108 S. Ct. at 529-30. The Court plainly reserved the issue of Younger's general applicability to federal proceedings seeking only
monetary relief. Although the majority opinion of Justice Blackmun may fairly be read
to support a parallel federal damage action that does not interfere with a pending state
proceeding, the concurring opinion of Justice White, which was joined by Justice
O'Connor, strongly suggests that Younger applies to actions seeking only money damages. See id. at 532-33 & nn.3-4 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 529 n.6 (declining
to reach issue of whether Younger applies to action where only money damages are
sought in federal forum).
269. See Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 645-50; Sheran, State Courts and Federalism in the

1980's: Comment, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 789, 792-93 (1981).
270. State courts patently failed to enforce federal rights during Reconstruction. See
Logan, supra note 38, at 507-10; Developments, supra note 1, at 1150-56. During the
1950s and 1960s state courts resisted the Warren Court's expansion of federal civil and
criminal rights. See Sheran, supra note 269, at 791; see also Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutions Affecting FederallyGuaranteedCivil Rights: FederalRemoval and HabeasCorpus
Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793 (1965) (federal courts have

obligation to intervene in state criminal prosecutions that flout federal constitutional
rights); cf. CommentariesI: Remarks of the HonorableJ. Harvie Wilkinson III, 38 S.C.L.
Rev. 437, 440 (1987) (referring to "unjustifiable abuses of state governments... in the
late 1950s and early 1960s").
271. See supra note 270.

272. Compare Bator, supra note 19, at 629-35 (arguing that state courts should continue to adjudicate federal constitutional claims) and Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 645-50
(arguing that a lack of parity between state and federal judges has yet to be proven) with
Kanowitz, DecidingFederal Law Issues in Civil Proceedings: State Versus Federal Trial

Courts, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 141, 168-69 (1976) (arguing that defendants in a state civil
proceeding should be permitted to seek a federal court injunction or declaratory judgment); cf. Marvell, The Rationalesfor Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examinationof Student Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1315, 1356-58 (litigants choose

to litigate in federal court because they perceive federal judges to be more knowledgeable
about federal law and more sympathetic to federally created rights).
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the supremacy clause to vigorously and forthrightly enforce federal
law. 273 Moreover, without regard to the merits of the academic debate,
the Supreme Court consistently has rejected the notion that state courts
are inadequate to enforce federal rights,27 4 and the Court is unlikely to
change its view of this issue. Although obviously not mandated by the
new era of state court competence, Younger abstention makes good sense
from the perspectives of both federalism and judicial economy.
Given the worthy rationales for the doctrine,2 7 and the doctrine's application in Pennzoil,2 76 the full expansion of Younger to civil litigation is
doctrinally sound, and there is no rational basis to limit Younger abstention to criminal and civil enforcement cases. 277 Accordingly, federal
courts should generally abstain from deciding federal issues that arise in
a prior pending state proceeding unless the federal plaintiff can establish
the lack of an adequate opportunity to raise and litigate the federal issue
in the state proceeding, 278 or can establish one of Younger's other
exceptions.2 79
CONCLUSION

After Pennzoil, there is no principled basis to limit Younger abstention
to criminal, quasi-criminal and civil enforcement cases. Consequently, a
federal court may abstain under Younger without regard to the character
273. See Althouse, supra note 182, at 1086; supra note 271; sources cited infra note
274; cf Althouse, How to Build a SeparateSphere: FederalCourts and State Power, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1489, 1537-38 (1987) (state courts will inevitably apply federal law
and should be encouraged to do so); Meltzer, State CourtForfeituresofFederalRights, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1231-34 (1986) (state courts generally try to fairly interpret and
apply federal law).
274. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493-94 n.35 (1976); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 755-56 (1975). But see
R. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 171-75 (1985) (cannot assume that
state judges understand and are able to fulfill their obligation to enforce federal rights).
275. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 198, 201-12 and accompanying text.
277. But see sources cited supra note 245 (expressing fear that full civil extension of
Younger will ultimately deny section 1983 plaintiffs a federal forum).
278. In view of the court's presumption of an adequate opportunity unless state law
precludes presentation of federal claims, see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text,
federal district courts should conduct evidentiary hearings on the issue of adequate opportunity when asked to abstain under Younger. See The Committee on Federal Courts
of the New York State Bar Association, Report on the Abstention Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Proceedings, 122 F.R.D. 89, 107 (Aug. 30,
1988) (suggesting that federal district courts should hold evidentiary hearings to assess
impact of abstention upon litigants' rights when asked to abstain).
279. While some critics have argued that the Court's interpretation of Younger's exceptions makes it difficult for the exceptions ever to apply, see, e.g., Yackle, supra note 63,
at 1045 n.21 1; Comment, supra note 9, at 1328-31; Comment, The Younger Abstention
Doctrine: Bleak Prospectsfor FederalIntervention in Pending State Proceedings, 19 Duq.
L. Rev. 313, 326-33 (1981), others argue that the exceptions are consistent with the basic
policies underlying noninterference with ongoing state proceedings. See, e.g., Collins,
The Right to Avoid Trial: JustifyingFederal Court Intervention into Ongoing State Court
Proceedings,66 N.C.L. Rev. 49, 54-72, 97-104 (1987).
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of the prior pending state proceeding. Preventing disruption of the state
judicial process is the critical rationale for Younger abstention, and it
applies in any litigation context-criminal or civil, public or private.
An early Younger commentator stated that "the Court has failed to
articulate a workable, principled formula for allocating responsibility for
constitutional adjudication between the two systems of courts. ' '2 8° This
may well be true. But to the extent that policy and theoretical foundations support Younger, they are equally applicable to private civil litigation as they are to criminal and civil enforcement litigation. If applied as
suggested here, Younger would at least allocate constitutional litigation
directly arising in an ongoing state proceeding to the state system.
280. Whitten, supra note 1, at 596.

